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Are Emerging Technologies in Airport Passenger Screening
Reasonable Under the Fourth Amendment?
I. Introduction
September 11, 2001, ushered in a new era in a multitude of
ways.

At the forefront is the issue of airport security and

passenger screening.

The United States is faced with the task

of protecting our citizens, our buildings, our skies, and our
country from another attack similar to that harrowing day that
changed the world forever.
thwart a future strike.

Technologies have emerged to help

Airports across the nation have started

to implement some of these technologies.

Americans now may be

subject to “backscatter x-rays” and “explosive trace portals”
prior to boarding aircraft at our nation’s airports.

These

tools present a tenuous balancing act between the need for
national security and citizens’ constitutional right against
warrantless search and seizure as afforded by the Fourth
Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches
and seizures.
question.

What amounts to “unreasonable” is the ultimate

This note will examine modern society’s definition of

“unreasonable” as it relates to the limits placed on technology
by the Fourth Amendment.

This note will also scrutinize two

specific airport passenger screening technologies and where they
fall on the reasonableness scale.

1

While the answer may or may

not be that our Fourth Amendment protections are implicated by
these technologies, this note will also look at whether the
definition of “unreasonable” has been affected by a climate of
fear; thus, what may have seemed unreasonable before September
11 may now be deemed reasonable.

This note will also examine

the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine and the “special
needs” doctrine as they apply to airport searches and similar
search methods that filter into general society once they become
ubiquitous in airports.

Part II will explore the evolution of

airport passenger screening.

Part III will trace the evolution

of the Fourth Amendment, case law, and the special needs
doctrine as it relates to passenger screening.

Part IV will

apply current law to the current and emerging screening
technologies and will analyze their constitutionality,
ultimately opining that while backscatter x-rays and explosive
trace portals are useful secondary screening tools, if used for
primary passenger screening they are unreasonable searches.
Finally, Part V will present a possible resolution to the
dilemma created by our need for security and our desire for
privacy, yet will conclude that certain technology may remain
too invasive to be labeled reasonable.
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II. The Evolution of Passenger Screening Technology

A. Background and Purpose
Airline passenger screening originated as a preventative
tool against airline hijackings during the late 1960s and early
1970s.1

On September 11, 1970, a date that is eerily

coincidental, President Nixon set forth a plan to combat
airplane hijacking.2

The program required the airlines to

develop inspection methods and install surveillance equipment at
all appropriate U.S. airports.3

As a result, the Federal

Aviation Administration (FAA) established the Anti-Hijacking
program.4

United States airlines worked with the Departments of

Defense and Transportation to ascertain whether military x-ray
machines and metal detectors could help prevent hijackings.5
The FAA issued a rule on February 1, 1972, dictating that
air carriers must screen all passengers using behavior

1

Comm. on Commercial Aviation Sec., Nat’l Research Council,

Airline Passenger Screening: New Technologies and Implementation
Issues 1, 6 (Nat’l Acad. Press 1996).
2

Id. at 6.

3

Id.

4

Id.

5

Id.
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profiling, magnetometers, identification check, or physical
search, or some combination of these systems.6

Unfortunately,

hijackings did not abate; on December 5, 1972, the FAA announced
emergency rules mandating screening of all passengers and carryon baggage for passenger flights.7

This program required

security systems implemented by the airlines which would prevent
passengers from bringing weapons, explosives, and incendiary
devices onto an airplane.8

The primary focus of these screenings

was, and continues today to be, metallic objects.9

However, as

turmoil throughout the world increased and U.S. airlines became
even more attractive to international terrorists, the FAA
recognized the need to expand airport screening systems.10

The

capacity to detect different types of metals, as well as plastic
explosives and other threatening materials, has become a
necessity.11
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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B. Magnetometers (Metal Detectors)
A magnetometer is an electronic metal detector resembling a
door frame.12

A person who walks through the portal passes

through a magnetic field, activating a warning light or signal.13
Metal detection portals produce a magnetic field that generates
eddy currents in metallic or ferromagnetic objects that pass
through the portal.14

If a passenger carries metal through the

portal in an amount equal to or greater than the calibration of
the detector, eddy currents are created.15

When the eddy

currents are detected, an alarm sounds and screening personnel
step in to determine if in fact a dangerous object or weapon is
present.16
The science behind the operation of the magnetometer is
built upon the fact that a magnetic field made up of lines of

12

United States v. Lopez, 328 F.Supp. 1077, 1085 (E.D.N.Y.

1971).
13

Gibson v. State, 921 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996).

14

Comm. on Commercial Aviation Sec., Nat’l Research Council,

supra note 1, at 13.
15

Id.

16

Id.
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flux encircles the earth.17

Since steel and other ferromagnetic

metals conduct better than air, metal will bend the flux lines
as the lines seek the path of least resistance by passing
through the metal rather than the air.18

When distortions happen

near a “fluxgate magnetometer,” a signal is created which can
detect the magnetic disturbances.19

C. Trace Detection Technologies
Trace detection entails inferring the presence of
explosives or other dangerous substances from air or material
samples physically collected from bodies or clothing.20
As of September 2006, 37 U.S. airports utilize trace
detection machines known as “puffers.”21

17

A puffer is a tall,

United States v. Lopez, 328 F.Supp. 1077, 1085 (E.D.N.Y.

1971).
18

Id.

19

Id.

20

Comm. on Commercial Aviation Sec., Nat’l Research Council,

supra note 1 at 4, 16 - 19.
21

Scott Lindlaw, Airport Screening Technology Developed,

Forbes.com, Sept. 8, 2006,
http://www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2006/09/08/ap3003993.html.
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transparent tube that a person steps into.22

Rapid blasts of air

(“not quite enough to ruffle the hair”23) dislodge trace
particles from the person’s skin and clothes which are sucked
into a filter and instantly analyzed to determine if that person
has been in the presence of explosives or narcotics.24
entire process takes approximately 15 seconds.25

The

Currently, this

technology is only being used by the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) as a secondary inspection for passengers
selected for further screening.26

22

Id.

23

Id.

24

New Methods to Prevent Terrorism on Aeroplanes Are Being

Developed, Economist, Aug. 17, 2006, available at
http://www.economist.com/science/displayStory.cfm?story_id=78015
78; Scott Lindlaw, supra note 20.
25

Eric Lipton, Screening Tools Slow to Arrive in U.S., N.Y.

Times, Sept. 3, 2006, at 11.

Puffers were developed by Sandia

National Laboratories in 1997 and are manufactured by General
Electric and Smiths Detection. Id.

They are the only machines

which automatically examine a person from head to toe for
residue of explosives. Id.
26

Alex Halperin, Airport Security Goes High-Tech, Bus. Week Eur.

On Yahoo! Fin., Aug. 13, 2006,
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There is some concern that puffers could produce falsepositives that would slow down airport screening lines if the
machines were used as a primary screening tool.27

For example,

because fertilizer can be used as a bomb ingredient, someone who
spread fertilizer on their lawn and went to the airport without
changing their shoes would be identified by the puffer as having
residue of explosive materials on their body.28

Another drawback

to using puffers for primary screening is that they cannot
detect liquid explosives, which are attractive to terrorists, as
recent events demonstrated.29

D. Imaging Technologies
The United States Department of Homeland Security
(“Homeland Security”) found that airport screeners using
magnetometers (metal detection portals, discussed above)
performed terribly when attempting to identify weapons in carry-

http://uk.biz.yahoo.com/13082006/244/airport-security-hightech.html.
27

Id.

28

Id.

29

Lipton, supra note 24.

8

on baggage or hidden on people’s bodies.30

These poor field test

results are Homeland Security’s justification for using
“backscatter” x-rays.31
“Imaging technologies can see through clothes and produce
an image of the human body underneath.”32

Active imaging

analyzes radiation which is scattered when the body is
irradiated with x-rays.33

The process is simple.

A person

stands in front of a large box and a very low power x-ray beam
sweeps across the body.34

Using three-dimensional imaging, a

computer converts the data into a picture of the person on a
monitor.35

Objects that scatter or give off radiation in a

different manner than the human body will look distinctive in

30

Joe Sharkey, On the Road; Airport Screeners Could Get X-Rated

X-Ray Views, N.Y. Times, May 24, 2005, at C5.
31

Id.

32

Comm. on Commercial Aviation Sec., Nat’l Research Council,

supra note 1, at 3, 14 – 16.
33

Id. at 3.

34

Fred Reed, Scanner Virtually Disrobes Passenger, Wash. Times,

May 22, 2003, http://www.washtimes.com/business/20030521-0948098963r.htm.
35

Id.
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the image.36

“Reflective” or backscatter x-rays can see objects

that a metal detector may miss, such as those made from ceramics
and plastics.37
These x-rays have been proven to be safe, penetrating a
mere 1/10th of an inch into the skin.38

36

In less than eight

Comm. on Commercial Aviation Sec., Nat’l Research Council,

supra note 1, at 3.
37

New Methods to Prevent Terrorism on Aeroplanes Are Being

Developed, supra note 24.
38

Reed, supra note 34.

The amount of radiation from a

backscatter x-ray amounts to less than three mircrorem, which
“is so low that a passenger would have to go through the
screening portal approximately 1,000 times to receive the same
radiation dose as would be received from cosmic ray exposure at
high altitude during one transcontinental flight from New York
to Los Angeles.” Comm. on Commercial Aviation Sec., Nat’l
Research Council, supra note 1, at 31.

“A person would have to

be scanned with backscatter approximately 80,000 times merely to
receive the amount of radiation contained in one dental X-ray.”
Michael C. Murphy & Michael R. Wilds, X-Rated X-Ray Invades
Privacy Rights, 12 Crim. Just. Pol’y Rev. 333, 338 (2001).
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seconds, the scan is complete, and no pat-down has to be
performed.39
However, as helpful as this technology may be in detecting
illicit materials, they also produce a problem many see as
equally disturbing.40
quality....

“The pictures are of near-pornographic

It amounts to a black-and-white strip search.”41

Appearing in the image are not only concealed weapons,
explosives, wallets, and coins, but also rolls of fat, the size
of breasts and genitals, and catheter tubes.42

Filters have been

created to blur the genital area in response to arguments that
the images are too intrusive.43

Cloaking software has also been

developed which converts the images into “something resembling a
generic chalk outline of the body, identifying plastic, ceramic,
biological and other nonmetallic and metallic objects on the

39

Reed, supra note 34.

40

Id.

41

Id.

42

Id.; Am. Civil Liberties Union, Airport Security: Increased

Safety Need Not Come at the Expense of Civil Liberties (2002),
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/resources/16748res20020612.html.
43

New Methods to Prevent Terrorism on Aeroplanes Are Being

Developed, supra note 24.
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body.”44

Manufacturers of the backscatter machines recognize

that cloaking may reduce detection power, but that may be a
trade-off that is required in order to balance security and
privacy issues.45

III. Evolution of the Law

A. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause....”46

44

Austin Considine, Will New Airport X-Rays Invade Privacy?,

N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 2005,
http://travel2.nytimes.com/2005/10/09/travel/09xray.html?ei=5070
&en=d9b0f1a73708dd7d&ex=1162267200&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1162094831PRDYC/rksrr5rr333hMnyw.
45

Id.

The two companies that manufacture the backscatter

technology are Rapiscan Systems, a division of OSI Systems, and
American Science and Engineering. Id.
46

U.S. Const. amend. IV.
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The question, of course, is what do those words actually
mean in an airport?

The following section will examine how the

Fourth Amendment has been construed by the courts with regard to
airport passenger screening.

Next, a few detailed

interpretations of the Fourth Amendment’s requirements such as
expectation of privacy and reasonableness will be discussed.
Finally, the special needs doctrine will be introduced.

This

principle will be further analyzed in Part IV where the Fourth
Amendment will be applied to the two emerging passenger
screening technologies discussed in Part II.

B. Case Law
The courts first must determine whether something
constitutes a search; if there is no search, Fourth Amendment
protections do not apply.47

i. Expectation of Privacy
Katz v. United States is a landmark Fourth Amendment case.48
While the case had no connection to airports, it is the starting
point for this article’s analysis because of its discussion of

47

Id.

48

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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privacy, search and seizure, and governmental action.49

The

United States Supreme Court’s 1967 opinion is helpful in
applying the Fourth Amendment to airport settings as it presents
a threshold test for determining whether the Fourth Amendment
applies to a particular intrusion.50
Justice Stewart wrote for the majority and stated that the
Fourth Amendment does not extend to things a person knowingly
and publicly reveals.51

On the other hand, the Fourth Amendment

may protect something a person tries to keep private, even in a
public area.52

49

Justice Harlan’s concurrence expands upon what

Id. The defendant was convicted of violating a statute

prohibiting bets via wire.

The Court had to determine whether

the government listening to and recording the defendant when he
spoke in a public telephone booth violated the defendant’s
privacy.

Holding that the defendant’s privacy, upon which he

justifiably relied, was violated, the Court further held that
this governmental action constituted a search and seizure.
50

Id.

51

Id. at 351.

52

Id.

The Court stated that making a phone call from a glass

telephone booth where he could be seen did not cause the
defendant to believe his words would be also be heard.

“To read

the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that
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protection the Fourth Amendment provides to people, stating,
“there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”53

Harlan’s test has since been

adopted by the Supreme Court as the method of determining what
constitutes a search, triggering protection by the Fourth
Amendment.

ii. Administrative Searches and Consent
“Search[es] of public or commercial premises carried out by
a regulatory authority for the purpose of enforcing compliance
with health, safety, or security regulations” are deemed
administrative searches.54

Private searches are those “conducted

by a private person rather than a law-enforcement officer.”55
The issue of consent and how it relates to the passenger’s or
general public’s knowledge of what type of screening procedures
are utilized at airports is a concept important to the analysis

the public telephone has come to play in private communication.”
Id. at 352.
53

Id. at 361.

54

Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004).

55

Id.
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of whether emerging technologies are or are not reasonable
searches and whether they will be barred or allowed by the
Fourth Amendment.

The language of the Fourth Amendment requires

“probable cause” prior to a search.56

Probable cause relates to

the likelihood, not certainty, of existence criminal activity.57
Administrative searches are an exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s requirement for a warrant based on probable cause,
but they remain subject to the requirement for reasonableness.58
The 1973 Ninth Circuit decision in United States v. Davis
concerned a defendant who was convicted of trying to board an
airplane with a loaded gun in his briefcase.59

The Court held

that even if the search of the defendant’s briefcase was
conducted by a private employee of the airline, the search was
state action60 for purposes of the Fourth Amendment because the

56

U.S. Const. amend. IV.

57

Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969).

58

United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973).

59

Davis, 482 F.2d at 895.

60

State action is “anything done by a government; esp., in

constitutional law, an intrusion on a person’s rights (esp.
civil rights) either by a governmental entity or by a private
requirement that can be enforced only by governmental action.”
Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004).
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search was part of the national anti-hijacking effort instituted
in 1972.61

The Court stated that evaluation of airport searches

should be conducted using standards related to “administrative”
searches.62

Administrative searches are not carried out to

gather evidence as part of a criminal investigation.63

Rather,

administrative searches are performed “as part of a general
regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose.”64
The court explained that airline passenger screening is part of
a general regulatory scheme, in furtherance of the
administrative purpose of preventing weapons or explosives from
being carried on to airplanes, which will prevent hijackings.65

61

Davis, 482 F.2d at 904.

62

Id. at 908.

63

Id.

64

Id.

65

Id.

The Court went on to explain that the essential purpose

of the regulatory scheme is to discourage people from weapons or
explosives on to airplanes, not to actually discover those
materials and arrest people carrying them. Id.

Further, if

passenger screening devolves into general searches for evidence
of crimes, courts will have to exclude any evidence obtained
from those searches. Id. at 909.
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To be valid, administrative searches must meet the standard
of reasonableness as required by the Fourth Amendment.66

To be

reasonable, a passenger “screening search must be as limited in
its intrusiveness as is consistent with satisfaction of the
administrative need that justifies it.”67

66

Id. at 910.

67

Id.

Consequently, valid

“The scope of the search must be ‘strictly tied to and

justified by’ the circumstances which rendered its initiation
permissible.” Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
Terry frisks, as they have come to be known, allow police to pat
down a person who has been legitimately stopped if the police
have reason to believe the person is armed and dangerous. Terry
v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

The justification for this frisk is

that the police are allowed to protect themselves while
questioning a person about possible criminal activity. Id.
Terry frisks are therefore not extended to encompass airport
screening searches because that “would result in intrusions upon
privacy unwarranted by the need.” Davis, 482 F.2d at 907.
“There is no reason to believe that the incidence of concealed
weapons is greater among airline passengers than among members
of the public generally, and Terry does not justify the
wholesale ‘frisking’ of the general public in order to locate
weapons and prevent future crimes.” Id. at 907-08.
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passenger screening searches at airports must acknowledge a
person’s right to decide not to board an airplane and therefore
not be subject to the search.68

The Court utilized the issue of

consent as the measurement of whether the search was prohibited
by the Fourth Amendment.69

A person has the choice, as a matter

of constitutional law, to submit to a search of his person and
carry-on baggage as a condition to boarding an airplane, or to
leave.70

The passenger’s choice can be seen as either a decision

to give up the right to leave or a decision to submit to the
search.71

Either way, the choice is seen as “a ‘consent,’

granting the government a license to do what it would otherwise
be barred from doing by the Fourth Amendment.”72
must be voluntary.73

This consent

The Court suggested that airports make the

options available to passengers approaching screening areas so
obvious that someone who decides to board an airplane has

68

Id. at 910-11.

69

Id. at 913.

70

Id.

71

Id.

72

Id.

73

Id. at 913-14 (discussing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.

218 (1973).
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consented to the screening.74

However, at the time the incident

at issue occurred, in 1971, “[t]he nature and scope of airport
searches were not then widely known.”75

Therefore, without clear

notice of the choice to be screened or not board the airplane,
attempting to board the airplane was not necessarily consent.76
Passenger consent to airport screening searches and the
general population’s awareness of the forms of screening
procedures employed at airports, are critical components of the
analysis of whether the Fourth Amendment will permit or prevent
the use of emerging screening technologies.
awareness are aspects of reasonableness.

Both consent and

The more the public

knows about newer technologies and the more the public accepts
their use, the greater the likelihood the technologies will be
deemed reasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment.

iii. Danger Satisfies Reasonableness Test
As demonstrated throughout this article, determining
reasonableness is the crux of the Fourth Amendment search issue.
In 1973, the Fifth Circuit decided that some situations present

74

Id. at 914.

75

Id.

76

Id.
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a level of danger such that the reasonableness test is per se
satisfied.77
Lee Skipwith III was convicted of cocaine possession after
an airport screening search revealed drugs, but not weapons.78
In United States v. Skipwith the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
Middle District of Florida, holding that the search was
constitutional.79

The Court found that balance must be struck

between the harm and the need to determine what is reasonable.80
“When the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and
millions of dollars of property inherent in the pirating or
blowing up of a large airplane, the danger alone meets the test
of reasonableness.”81

77

United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973).

78

Id.

79

Id. The drugs were also held to be properly admitted into

evidence at trial. Id.

This line of inquiry is outside the

scope of this article.
80

Id. at 1276.

81

Id.

The Court further explained that the search must have a

reasonable scope, must be conducted in good faith in order to
prevent hijacking, and the passenger must have received advance
notice of the search in such a manner that he could avoid the
search by opting not to fly. Id.
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The Skipwith Court expanded on United States v. Moreno82 by
holding that “those who actually present themselves for boarding
on an air carrier, like those seeking entrance into the country,
are subject to a search based on mere or unsupported
suspicion.”83

The Court analogized the difference between the

main airport and the boarding gate to the difference between the
borders of the country and the interior of the country.84
The defendant also unsuccessfully argued that the search he
was subjected to was too broad in scope: that the search was
constitutionally limited to a frisk for weapons and he should
not have been required to empty his pockets.85

82

Noting that

United States v. Moreno, 480 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1973), held

that reasonableness should be determined on a case-by-case basis
when regarding searches of people in the general airport area.
83

Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1276.

84

Id. at 1276-77.

85

Id. at 1277.

The officer asked Skipwith to empty his pockets

once he noticed a three inch by two inch bulge in his pants
pocket, after discovering he was traveling under a false name,
and after noticing that the defendant was very nervous and
appeared to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Id. at
1273-74.

The officer later testified that he believed the bulge

22

“[t]he range and variety of devices real and simulated which can
be used to intimidate the crew of an aircraft while it is aloft
is almost limitless[,]” the Court found that the officer “was
justified in undertaking a search with sufficient scope to
reveal an object or instrumentality that Skipwith could
reasonably have used to effect an act of air piracy.”86
The amount of danger posed to the public by a person who
seeks to blow up an airplane coupled with the concept of airport
boarding gates as analogous to our nation’s borders has created
a situation in the U.S. where passenger airport screening
searches may be viewed by the courts as virtually per se
reasonable.

The important issue for emerging screening

technologies is whether factors unique to those technologies
make the reasonableness of their use less certain.

was a gun, although it turned out to be a plastic bag containing
cocaine. Id. at 1274.
86

Id. at 1277 (5th Cir. 1973).

The Court went on to say that

the three inch by two inch pocket bulge clearly fell within the
limit of such a search. Id.
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iv. Magnetometers are Administrative Searches
A section of the Gibson v. State87 decision addressed
whether the defendant was subjected to unlawful restraint by
being required to pass through a metal detector before entering
a courthouse.88

This part of the opinion traces the evolution of

case law related to the Fourth Amendment, administrative
searches, and airport searches.89
Gibson was a Texas attorney who petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus alleging that his liberty was restrained by the
Sheriff of El Paso County, who required that Gibson walk through
a metal detector and pass his belongings through an x-ray
machine, similar to the requirements in airports, before being
allowed to enter the courthouse.90

The Court restated the long-

standing finding that “the use of a magnetometer is a ‘search’
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”91

The Court

explained that only unreasonable searches and seizures are
forbidden by the Constitution, and that “warrantless searches

87

Gibson v. State, 921 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996).

88

Id. at 756-759.

89

Id.

90

Id. at 747.

91

Id. at 757 (citing United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769,

770 (4th Cir. 1972)).
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are per se unreasonable unless the search falls within one of ‘a
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’”92
The courthouse magnetometer search was a warrantless
search, the reasonableness of which must be determined by
weighing the governmental interest against the invasion of
privacy caused by the search.93

As the Court analyzed the

reasonableness of the situation at hand, it evaluated prior
decisions that related to magnetometer searches at airports.94
The Court determined that the proper standard to be used to
assess magnetometer searches is that of the administrative
search because at its heart, an administrative search is not
conducted to gather evidence as part of a criminal
investigation, but rather is performed as part of a general
regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose.95

92

Gibson, 921 S.W.2d at 757 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389

U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
93

Id. “The search must be ‘justified at its inception’ and

‘reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place.’” Id. (quoting
Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
94

Id. at 757-59.

95

Id. at 757-58.

See supra text Part III.B.ii.
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v. Avoiding Airport Screening Searches by Electing Not
to Fly
The main airport area has been distinguished from the
boarding gate area.96

Airport screening searches are not

conducted until a person wishes to move into the boarding gate
area.

Since September 11, 2001, only ticketed passengers are

allowed to pass through to the boarding gates.97

The question of

specifically when a person can change his mind about whether to
be screened and to fly was addressed in Torbet v. United
Airlines Inc.98
At a Los Angeles International Airport security checkpoint,
Hugo Torbet walked through the metal detector and sent his
carry-on bag through the x-ray scanner.99

Torbet’s bag was

selected for a random search, but he refused to allow it.100

96

See supra Part III.B.iii.

97

Each airline may make exceptions for minors traveling alone,

the elderly, or those with physical challenges. Denver
International Airport, Frequently Asked Questions About Security
Procedures, http://www.flydenver.com/guide/tips/security.asp
(last visited Feb. 19, 2007).
98

Torbet v. United Airlines Inc., 298 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2002).

99

Id. at 1088.

100

Id.
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Torbet declared that he wished to leave the airport rather than
consent to the search, but was told by a police officer (who had
been called for by security personnel) that he could not leave
until his bag was searched.101

Nothing of significance was found

in the search, and Torbet continued on to his flight.102
Torbet later sued on a number of grounds, challenging “the
policy that bags be subject to random search without reasonable
suspicion that the bags contain weapons or explosives.”103
District Court found for the defendants.104

The

Torbet appealed on

only one of his claims, arguing “that random post-x-ray searches
are facially invalid, in the absence of express consent, unless
the x-ray scan arouses suspicion.”105
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, stating that under Davis,106
screening procedures at airports must be reasonable to comply
with the Fourth Amendment.107

“An airport screening search is

101

Id.

102

Id.

103

Id.

104

Id. at 1089.

105

Id.

106

United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973).

107

Torbet, 298 F.3d at 1089 (citing Davis, 482 F.2d at 904,

910).
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reasonable if: (1) it is not more extensive or intensive than
necessary, in light of current technology, to detect weapons or
explosives; (2) it is confined in good faith to that purpose;
and (3) passengers may avoid the search by electing not to
fly.”108

The election not to fly must occur prior to the

passenger putting luggage on the x-ray conveyor.109

The Court

then held that by putting his bag on the x-ray conveyor belt
Torbet impliedly consented to the random search.110

vi. Warrantless, Suspicionless Searches
Christian Hartwell was arrested for possession of crack
cocaine after setting off a metal detector at a security

108

Id. (citing Davis, 482 F.2d at 913).

109

Id. (citing United States v. Pulido-Baquerizo, 800 F.2d 899,

901-02 (9th Cir. 1986)).
110

Id. “‘[P]assengers placing luggage on an x-ray machine’s

conveyor belt for airplane travel at a secured boarding area
impliedly consent to a visual inspection and limited hand search
of their luggage if the x-ray scan is inconclusive in
determining whether the luggage contains weapons or other
dangerous objects.’” Id. (quoting Pulido-Baquerizo, 800 F.2d at
901).
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checkpoint in the Philadelphia International Airport.111

A hand-

held wand magnetometer was subsequently used to determine what
had caused the portal detector alarm.112

What transpired next is

disputed by the parties,113 but based on the undisputed facts,

111

United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 175 (3rd Cir. 2006).

112

Id.

113

The defendant claimed he was taken to a private screening

room by a Transportation Security Administration agent.

The

agent repeatedly requested that Hartwell show what was in his
pockets.

After multiple refusals, the agent reached into the

defendant’s pocket, pulled out a package of drugs, and called
the Philadelphia police.

The police then searched the

defendant, found two more packages of drugs, and arrested him.
In contrast, the government claimed that neither the TSA
agent nor the police reached into the defendant’s pocket without
consent.

The agent said that Hartwell requested a private

screening and then refused to show the contents of his pocket.
He then “nervously backed away” from the agent and “suddenly
dropped his pants.”

This caused the agent to call for backup.

When a police officer arrived, the defendant responded to the
officer’s request to remove items from his pocket by handing
over a package of drugs.

Hartwell then pretended to fall on the

floor and dropped another drug package.
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both the District Court and Third Circuit found the search was
justified.114
The Third Circuit held the administrative search doctrine
permitted the search and did not evaluate the lower court’s

Neither the defendant nor the government disputed that the
defendant set off the metal detector.

Hartwell did not dispute

that he was told to remove all metal objects from his body prior
to screening and that he was asked to remove objects from a
specific pocket multiple times.

The District Court found the

officers’ actions were justified on these facts, regardless of
which account of the rest of story was true. Id. at 176.
114

Id. The District Court held the search was permissible under

three theories: 1) the search was not unreasonable, thereby was
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment; 2) the search “was a
‘consensual administrative search;’” and 3) the defendant gave
his implied consent to the search when he submitted to the
screening process and once the alarm sounded, the defendant was
required by law to finish the search to determine the alarm’s
cause. Id. at 175 (3rd Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v.
Hartwell, 296 F.Supp.2d 596, 602 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (citing United
States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973)).
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alternate theories.115

While a search in the absence of

suspicion or wrongdoing is normally unreasonable, the Supreme
Court has acknowledged a few circumstances in which this rule is
inapplicable.116

“These circumstances typically involve

administrative searches of ‘closely regulated’ businesses, other
so-called ‘special needs’ cases, and suspicionless ‘checkpoint’
searches.”117

The Court stated that suspicionless searches at

checkpoints “are permissible under the Fourth Amendment when a

115

United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 177-78 (3rd Cir.

2006). In an opinion published on the day he received his
commission to be Justice of the United States Supreme Court,
Judge Alito noted that airport security screenings prior to
boarding a plane are searches.

One difficulty in this case

concerned whether the defendant was subject to multiple searches
or one extended search.

While there is case law on both sides

of this argument, the Court here followed Skipwith and similar
cases, which “analyze an entire checkpoint search, including
‘[m]etal detectors, visual inspection, and rare but potential
physical searches,’ as a single search.” Id. (quoting United
States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1275-76 (5th Cir. 1973)).
116

Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 178.

117

Id.

The special needs doctrine is addressed infra Part

III.C.
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court finds a favorable balance between ‘the gravity of the
public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the
seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the
interference with individual liberty.’”118
The Court then found that the airport checkpoint in this
case passed this balancing test.119

First, the Court emphasized

the importance of preventing terrorist attacks against
airplanes.120

Next, the Court found that the public interest is

advanced by security checkpoints at airports because without
searches, there is not a reliable way to determine which
passengers may hijack a plane.121

Finally, the Court stated that

minimally intrusive search procedures were utilized in this
case.122

118

Id. at 178-79 (citing Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427

(2004) (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979)).
119

Id. at 179.

120

Id.

121

Id. at 179-80.

122

Id. at 180. The Court found that the procedures used “were

well-tailored to protect personal privacy, escalating in
invasiveness only after a lower level of screening disclosed a
reason to conduct a more probing search.” Id.
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This case is significant for several reasons.

First, it is

quite recent, having been decided on January 31, 2006.123
Second, the opinion takes a definitive position on an aspect of
screenings that the courts have been divided on by stating that
the administrative search doctrine permitted the search in this
case.124

Third, the Court addressed administrative searches at

length and spelled out the test for when warrantless,
suspicionless searches are permissible.125

This test will be an

important tool for evaluating new security screening
technologies.

Finally, the opinion was written by then-Judge

Alito,126 now Supreme Court Justice Alito, which may give us a
glimpse into the future and how the Supreme Court may interpret
the Fourth Amendment as it relates to new technologies in
airport passenger screening.

C. The Special Needs Doctrine
The ‘special needs’ doctrine is an exception to the general
rule that warrantless and suspicionless searches are presumed to

123

Id. at 174.

124

Id. at 177.

125

Id. at 177-181.

126

Id. at 174.
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be unreasonable.127

This doctrine allows government officials to

conduct searches in the absence of any suspicion of criminality
in limited circumstances where the purpose of the search is not
to gather evidence for the investigation of crime.128
This doctrine originated in Justice Blackmun’s 1985
concurring opinion in New Jersey v. T.L.O.129

Blackmun agreed

the balancing test the majority applied was correct; however, he
noted that “[o]nly in those exceptional circumstances in which
special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make
the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a

127

Fourth Amendment ‘Special Needs’ Doctrine Justifies

Suspicionless Subway Checkpoints, 75 U.S. L. Week 1115, 1115
(2006).
128

Tracy Maclin, Is Obtaining an Arrestee’s DNA a Valid Special

Needs Search Under the Fourth Amendment? What Should (and Will)
the Supreme Court Do? 170 (Boston University School of Law,
Working Paper Series, Public law & Legal Theory, Working Paper
No. 06-15, 2006), available at
http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/abstract
s/2006/pdf_files/MaclinT062806.pdf.

Fourth Amendment ‘Special

Needs’ Doctrine Justifies Suspicionless Subway Checkpoints,
supra note 127, at 1115.
129

New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
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court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that
of the Framers.”130

The special needs doctrine was embraced in

later cases by a majority of the Court as the standard for
evaluating whether suspicionless searches are valid.131
Recently, the Second Circuit evaluated checkpoint searches
at New York City subway stations.132

Because the search program

was aimed only at detecting explosives and people were free to
refuse to be searched if they left the subway, the Court held
that protecting the subway from terrorist attack was a special
need aside from general law enforcement.133

This is the

130

Id. at 351.

131

Maclin, supra note 128 at 172.

132

MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260 (2nd Cir. 2006).

133

Id. at 270-71.

“Accordingly, preventing a terrorist from

bombing the subways constitutes a special need that is distinct
from ordinary post hoc criminal investigation.” Id. at 271.
opinion then cited to United States v. Hartwell, noting that
decision rejected a “Fourth Amendment challenge to airport
checkpoints and recogniz[ed] the need to ‘prevent terrorist
attacks on airplanes.’” Id. at 271 (citing United States v.
Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 179 (3rd Cir. 2006)).
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The

threshold showing the special needs doctrine requires.134

The

plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued that defending the subway
against terrorists only constitutes a special need if an attack
is imminent.135

The Second Circuit concluded that an emergency

did not have to exist in order to qualify a crime prevention
search as a special need.136
The doctrine next requires the court analyzing the validity
of a suspicionless search to balance opposing factors such as
whether the government interest for the search program is
immediate and substantial, whether the person being searched has

134

Fourth Amendment ‘Special Needs’ Doctrine Justifies

Suspicionless Subway Checkpoints, supra note 127, at 1115.
135

The plaintiffs based their argument on a comment made by the

U.S. Supreme Court in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond: “Of
course, there are circumstances that may justify a law
enforcement checkpoint where the primary purpose would
otherwise, but for some emergency, relate to ordinary crime
control.” Fourth Amendment ‘Special Needs’ Doctrine Justifies
Suspicionless Subway Checkpoints, supra note 127, at 1115
(quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44
(2000)).
136

Id.

See also MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 271 (2nd Cir.

2006).
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an actual and reasonable expectation of privacy surrounding the
item being searched, whether the search is minimally intrusive,
and whether the search program effectively advances the
government interest.137

Taking these factors in turn, the Court

first stated that significant weight can be assigned to the
government’s interest in preventing great harm to the public
whether or not an express threat exists.138

In fact, “[a]ll that

is required is that the ‘risk to public safety [be] substantial
and real’ instead of merely symbolic.”139

Next, the Court

decided that subway passengers have an expectation of privacy
with regards to objects they carry in closed, opaque bags.140
However, the subway checkpoint search minimally intruded upon
the passengers’ privacy expectation.141

137

Finally, the Court

Fourth Amendment ‘Special Needs’ Doctrine Justifies

Suspicionless Subway Checkpoints, supra note 127, at 1115.

See

also MacWade, 460 F.3d at 270-71 (explaining the second facet of
the special needs doctrine is to determine the reasonableness of
a search by balancing several factors).
138

MacWade, 460 F.3d at 272.

139

Id. (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322-23

(1997)).
140

Id.

141

Id.
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stated that it was not their place to perform an in depth
analysis of the efficacy of the checkpoint search program.142
Rather, the Court found that the program was an effective
deterrent, in part because “expert testimony established that
terrorists seek predictable and vulnerable targets, and the [New
York Police Department’s subway] Program generates uncertainty
that frustrates that goal, which, in turn, deters an attack.”143
The Court therefore held that the subway checkpoint search
program was reasonable and constitutional, by use of the special
needs doctrine.144

IV. Application of the Law
Tracing the evolution of the law as it applies to airport
screenings reveals a number of points about our Fourth Amendment
protections that are disturbing.

A review of the cases related

to airport searches illustrates that the private person rarely
wins and the searches are almost always found to be
reasonable.145

Further, avoiding screening by electing not fly

does not amount to a real choice by the passenger.

142

Id. at 273.

143

Id. at 274.

144

Id. at 275.

145

See supra Part II.

38

Searches must be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, but
reasonableness for airport searches is judged by weighing the
individual’s right to be free from intrusion against the general
public’s interest in traveling safely by air.146

As declared in

Torbet, the test for determining whether an airport screening
search is reasonable stems from Davis and consists of three
elements: “(1) it is not more extensive or intensive than
necessary, in light of current technology, to detect weapons or
explosives; (2) it is confined in good faith to that purpose;
and (3) passengers may avoid the search by electing not to
fly.”147

146

United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 616 (9th Cir. 2005)

(citing United States v. Pulido-Baquerizo, 800 F.2d 899, 901
(9th Cir. 1986).
147

Torbet v. United Airlines Inc., 298 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir.

2002) (citing United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 913 (9th
Cir. 1973)).
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A. Magnetometers (Metal Detectors)
The law is clear that metal detectors, or magnetometers,
are reasonable searches at airports.148

A person walking through

a metal detection portal is subject to a minimal invasion of
privacy and the portal “does not annoy, frighten, or humiliate
those who pass through it.”149

In perhaps the clearest statement

of why metal detector searches are reasonable, the Fourth
Circuit stated, “the use of a magnetometer to detect metal ...
is not a resented intrusion on privacy, but, instead, a welcome
reassurance of safety.

Such a search is more than reasonable;

it is a compelling necessity to protect essential air commerce
and the lives of passengers.”150
When magnetometers were first introduced as a regular part
of airport screening in the early 1970’s, most people laughed at
the thought of security personnel going through their bags and

148

Gibson v. State, 921 S.W.2d 747, 757 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996)

(citing United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 770 (4th Cir.
1972)).
149

United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 806 (2nd Cir.

1974)).
150

United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 772 (4th Cir. 1972).
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determining what they were carrying on their bodies.151

But as

history reveals, we adjusted to metal detector screenings prior
to boarding planes, and now society regards them as normal.152
In fact, now people may even be hesitant to get on plane if
there was no security screening prior to boarding.

Acceptance

of this type of warrantless and suspicionless search has
trickled into other parts of society as well.153

151

There are metal

Wayne LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth

Amendment § 10.6 (3d ed. 1996).
152

Paul Glastris, ...One That Should Be The Best, But Isn’t,

Washington Monthly, Mar. 1998, available at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1316/is_n2_v20/ai_6424713.
153

For example, in 1994, the Kentucky Attorney General released

an opinion regarding metal detector searches in schools.
Stating that the administrative search doctrine had been used to
find metal detector searches in airports constitutional, the
opinion found that the doctrine also supported the use of metal
detectors in schools due to the increased number of weapons
being brought into schools.

The Attorney General further noted

that the administrative search doctrine had also been used to
uphold the use of metal detectors in courthouses.
Gen. 94-58 (1994).
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Op. Ky. Att’y

detectors at courthouses, schools, and stadiums.154

While some

may find magnetometers at these types of locations annoying,
society in general has allowed their use without an uproar that
our Fourth Amendment rights are being violated.155

154

“It is, for example, common practice to require every

prospective airline passenger, or every visitor to a public
building, to pass through a metal detector that will reveal the
presence of a firearm or an explosive.” Michigan Dept. of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
“The metal detectors has [sic] their advent at the airports.
Their use has spread to prisons and courts. At the time of
submitting this petition, their use has spread to some urban
schools.”

Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 36-37, Lamson v.

United States, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1013 (1993) (No. 03-3674).
155

In fact, cases regarding metal detectors are virtually non-

existent at the Supreme Court level.

“This Court has never

dealt with a case involving the legality of stationary metal
detector searches at federal building that house courts such as
those in which defendant practices. Indeed, the Court has never
taken certiorari in cases involving challenges to metal detector
searches at airports.”

Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 36-

37, Lamson v. United States, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1013 (1993)
(No. 03-3674).
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It is a slippery slope to be mindful of, particularly in
light of the much more intrusive search technologies that are
emerging for use in airports.

We risk eroding our Fourth

Amendment rights to the point of being meaningless if we allow
our adjustment to technology in airports to become an automatic
approval for using that technology in other contexts.156

The

White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security was
reminded of this consequence in 1996: “[B]e mindful that the
security system adopted for airports today will likely be
imposed in other arenas tomorrow.

Just as magnetometers and X-

ray machines have found their ways into government buildings,
banks, and schools, so may the enhanced security measures the
Commission may recommend.”157

156

These other contexts do not share

“The process of intrusion into one’s daily life is rapidly

becoming routine as society becomes desensitized to the creeping
encroachment on individual privacy.

Increasing intrusions on

privacy at venues other than border checkpoints or airports
naturally follow....

Hence, the slippery slope of eroding

privacy begins.” Murphy & Wilds, supra note 38, at 333.
157

Gregory T. Nojeim, Legislative Counsel, Am. Civil Liberties

Union, Civil Liberties Implications of Airport Security
Measures, Statement Before White House Commission in Aviation
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many of the characteristics of airports that made the searches
“reasonable” in the first place.

For example, courthouses and

stadiums are not analogous to national borders.

One cannot

elect to not attend school if one does not wish to consent to a
search.158

i. Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions
Proceeding down that slippery slope of magnetometers
prompts an aside regarding the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions.

This doctrine asserts that the government cannot

force a person to relinquish a constitutional right in exchange
for a discretionary benefit that has little relation to that
right.159

Safety and Security (Sept. 5, 1996)
(http://www.epic.org/privacy/fee/aclu_testimony.html).
158

Massachusetts passed the first compulsory school attendance

law in 1852.

Every state in the nation had a similar law by

1918. Samuel L. Blumenfeld, Are Compulsory School Attendance
Laws Necessary? Part 1, Freedom Daily, Mar. 1991,
http://www.fff.org/freedom/0391c.asp.
159

Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994).

See also

Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (explaining that
despite the fact that one does not have a right to a government
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In the airport context, the benefit that the government
confers is the use of government facilities for air transport
and the use of the nation’s air lanes.

The government grants

this benefit on the condition that people relinquish their
Fourth Amendment right to be free from searches absent probable
cause.

As stated above, the doctrine requires that the

relinquishment of the right must be substantially related to the
benefit conferred.

Since metal detector searches are designed

to prevent airline hijackings and to promote the safety of air
travel, the condition is substantially related to the benefit.
September 11 further demonstrated the substantial relationship
between the necessity of relinquishing the right to be free from
searches absent probable cause and the benefit of traveling by
air.

Therefore, with regards to airport screenings, the

condition the government imposes is constitutional.
However, that same search via use of a metal detector may
not satisfy the doctrine in the school or courthouse context.
This is because entering schools and courthouses are not
discretionary benefits, as is using an airport.

There is a

fundamental constitutional right to go to school (in fact, the

benefit and the government may have many reasons for denying one
a benefit, denial may not be based on an infringement of
constitutionally protected interests).
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government has made this mandatory160) and to go to court, but
not to fly.161

This means the government has no right to block

people from accessing schools or courts.

The level of scrutiny

applied to the examination of the substantial relationship
between the right relinquished and the benefit conferred is
roughly the same as the standard of review used for direct
infringements of the constitutional right involved.

Since

strict scrutiny is utilized for fundamental rights, the analysis
of whether the conditions imposed on people entering schools and
courthouses are unconstitutional would be much more stringent
than the analysis used in the airport context.
It may be that metal detector searches can be shown to be
substantially related to entering schools and courthouses, even
using strict scrutiny.

But what about the emerging airport

screening technologies that are more intrusive?

160

It is not yet

E.g., People v. Dukes, 580 N.Y.S.2d 850, 853 (1992).

See

also supra note 158 (discussing states’ enactments of compulsory
school attendance laws).
161

The fundamental right to travel does not translate to a

fundamental right to fly.

If one is denied a single mode of

travel, even the most convenient mode, the right to travel has
not been infringed upon. Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1125,
1136-37 (2006).
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settled that those are constitutional in the airport setting,
much less anywhere else.162

We need to be wary of new

technologies used for airport searches reaching into other parts
of society without our first performing a thorough examination
of what rights would be eroded by their allowance.163

B. Trace Detection Technologies
The “puffer” machines being utilized at more and more
airports intrude minimally on the privacy of passengers, similar
to metal detectors.

Therefore, the analysis of whether they

satisfy the reasonableness test is virtually identical to that
for magnetometers.164
The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) favors machines
such as puffers because they “preserve the privacy and dignity

162

See infra, Parts IV.B and IV.C.

163

See generally Dukes, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 853 (comparing

administrative searches using metal detectors in schools to
those in airports and courthouses).

Dukes was the first case

which litigated the issue of metal detectors in schools. Charles
J. Russo & Jacqueline A. Stefkovich, Search and Seizure in the
Schools, NASSP Bull. (Nat’l Ass’n of Secondary School
Principals), Sept. 1998.
164

See supra Part IV.A.
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of passengers far more than pat-downs, physical searches, and
backscatter x-rays.”165
with this technology.166

False positives are a continuing concern
Items such as heart medicines may be so

similar chemically to an explosive that the alarm is
triggered.167

The ACLU suggests that Congress oversees the

implementation of puffers to make certain that there is not an
unacceptably high percentage of false positives and that people
who prompt false positives are treated fairly.168
It should be noted that trace detection machines which can
identify chemical signatures could be used to recognize illegal

165

Timothy D. Sparapani, Legislative Counsel, Am. Civil

Liberties Union, Testimony Regarding the U.S. Transportation
Security Administration’s Physical Screening of Airline
Passengers and Related Cargo and Airport Screening, Principles
for Evaluating Physical Screening Techniques and Technologies
Consistent with Constitutional Norms, Before the U.S. Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (Apr. 4,
2006) (http://www.aclu.org/privacy/gen/24856leg20060404.html).
166

See supra Part II.C.

167

Id.

168

Id.
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drugs.169

Use in this capacity would constitute an illegal

search “because airport searches are authorized only to identify
objects or materials that are a threat to the safety of the
airplane.”170

Since illegal drugs do not in and of themselves

threaten airplane safety, airport security is not allowed to
search specifically for drugs.171
While no court has yet been faced with deciding the
constitutionality of trace detection portals, the analogy to
metal detectors and the reasonableness of their use at airports
seems certainly predictable.

Because the intrusion on personal

privacy is negligible, there is little concern that the use of
this emerging technology in passenger screening will erode our
Fourth Amendment rights.

In the absence of an invasion of

bodily privacy, there seems little basis to declare puffers to
be unreasonable searches.

169

Comm. on Commercial Aviation Sec., Nat’l Research Council,

supra note 1, at 42 .
170

Id.

171

Id.
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C. Imaging Technologies
Backscatter x-rays are certainly considered searches under
the Katz test.172

People have an expectation of privacy for what

is under their clothes.173

Whether backscatter x-rays are

reasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment is far from
clear.

What is clear is that many groups oppose the use of this

technology.

Privacy International awarded the Federal Aviation

Administration the “Most Invasive Proposal” Award for the
BodyScan scanners being placed in airports for use by Customs.174
Privacy International presents its “Big Brother Awards” annually
in the U.S. (as well a number of other countries) to
organizations that invade personal privacy the most.175
Although ten years ago imaging technologies such as
backscatter x-rays were just beginning to be developed, privacy

172

See supra Part II.B.i.

173

Addie S. Ries, America's Anti-hijacking Campaign--Will It

Conform to Our Constitution?, 3 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 123 (2001).
174

The award statue is called the “Orwell” and depicts a boot

stomping on a head.

See

http://www.privacyinternational.org/bigbrother/us2000/.
175

Id.
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concerns were already contemplated.176

As with trace detection

of illegal drugs, imaging technology presents the ability to
discover illegal items on a passenger’s body that are not
threatening, and therefore are not within the scope of the
constitutional search.177

The Panel on Passenger Screening

stated, “Fourth Amendment challenges based on illegal search or
on an improperly carried out search must be expected when these
technologies are implemented in airports.”178

Another issue the

Panel predicted in 1996 related to archiving of the images.179
They noted that the ability to store images of passengers until
flights arrived safely at their destinations could generate
invasion of privacy lawsuits.180

The Panel stressed that

protocols related to the use and disposal of the images of
passengers’ bodies must be developed to safeguard this highly
sensitive and personal data.181

176

Comm. on Commercial Aviation Sec., Nat’l Research Council,

supra note 1, at 14-16.
177

Id. at 41.

178

Id.

179

Id.

180

Id.

181

Id.
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Those who support the use of backscatter x-rays point out
that courts have allowed passenger searches via metal detectors
under the administrative search doctrine and the public has
grown accustomed to submitting searches in many places in
addition to airports.182

The issue with backscatter x-rays (and

other emerging technologies) is therefore how they differ from
metal detectors.183

One argument is that an increased need for

security in our airports could create a justification for the
courts to allow suspicionless searches no matter what level of
privacy intrusion is created.184

A second argument is that the

backscatter x-ray would be used as an alternative to hand or
strip-searches, both of which are more intrusive than the
backscatter.185

Finally, backscatter x-rays detect plastic

explosives and weapons components that metal detectors miss.186

182

Murphy & Wilds, supra note 38, at 336-37.

183

Id. at 337.

184

Id.

185

Id. at 337-38.

186

Id. at 337.
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A middle ground view of imaging technologies goes directly
to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.187
The question then is whether the search was reasonable under the
circumstances.188

How is this decided?

“The greater the level

of suspicion, the more intrusive the search may be....
[I]ntrusion is keyed to embarrassment, indignity, and invasion
of privacy.”189
On the other side, opponents of backscatter x-rays for
passenger screening loudly protest the invasion of privacy
caused by this technology.

Backscatter x-rays utilized as a

primary screening tool would likely have a more difficult time
satisfying the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment.

While magnetometers do not have the ability to

detect explosives or biological weapons, trace detection portals
would clearly be a less intrusive search than backscatter x-rays
for that purpose.

“Body-scanning is a debasing and humiliating

procedure, and its routine use fails basic balancing tests....

187

Steven Vina, Virtual Strip Searches at Airports: Are Border

Searches Seeing Through the Fourth Amendment?, 8 Tex. Wesleyan
L. Rev. 417, 424 (2002).
188

Id.

189

United States v. Mejia, 720 F.2d 1378, 1382 (5th Cir. 1983).
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This technology should be used as a last resort.”190
Manufacturers of the technology say that using backscatter as a
tool secondary to metal detectors defeats its advantages.191
They maintain that some of the passengers who do not set off a
metal detector are exactly the people who should be screened
with backscatter.192

However, a potential problem of backscatter

x-rays if used as primary screening devices is that legal items
might be mistaken for illegal ones, prompting a further
search.193

190

Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Calls for

Removal of Controversial See-Through Scanner in Orlando (Mar.
15, 2002)
(http://www.aclu.org/privacy/gen/14808prs20020315.html).

The

press release goes on to argue that explosives detection
equipment may provide the same amount of security as backscatter
x-rays, but without an invasion of bodily privacy. Id.
191

Considine, supra note 44.

192

Id.

193

“Even the presence of an innocuously shaped item, such as a

prosthetic device or implant, will require subsequent (and
potentially humiliating) verification.

Thus, X-ray backscatter

requires a tremendous invasion of privacy with little speed or
efficacy gains.” Sparapani, supra note 165.
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The ACLU is against the use of backscatter x-rays for
primary passenger screening.194

“Passengers expect privacy

underneath their clothing and should not be required to display
highly personal details of their bodies such as evidence of
mastectomies, colostomy appliances, penile implants, catheter
tubes, and the size of their breasts or genitals as a
prerequisite to boarding a plane.”195

Further, security searches

have been the cover for the sexual assault of many women.196
Given the amount of detail the backscatter images reveal,
“[a]buse of this powerful technology is not a hypothetical....
Given recent experiences, it is inevitable.

Airport security

personnel do not check their sexual impulses at the door when
they arrive for work.”197
Despite all of the legitimate privacy concerns this
technology presents, it is likely to be accepted, just as metal
detector searches have been.

But the acceptance should be

limited to use as a secondary screening tool, as that is the

194

Am. Civil Liberties Union, Airport Security: Increased Safety

Need Not Come at the Expense of Civil Liberties (2002),
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/resources/16748res20020612.html.
195

Id.

196

Am. Civil Liberties Union, supra note 190.

197

Id.
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only reasonable application for a technology which is so
invasive.

Under Skipwith, mere suspicion is all that is

required to perform an airport passenger search.198

The Skipwith

opinion permitted the scope of a search to be as broad as
necessary to confirm the passenger had no weapons while also
mandating that the imposition on the passenger could be no
greater than necessary.199

Searches such as pat-downs and strip-

searches have already been found to be reasonable for preventing
passengers from carrying weapons onto airplanes.200

It is

therefore likely that backscatter x-rays will be allowed as an
alternative secondary search form since they are comparably
invasive, if not actually less so than pat-downs and stripsearches.201

The Hartwell court stated that a more highly

invasive search which was narrowly tailored to protect privacy
and which was utilized only after a regular screening revealed a
foundation for a more involved search were permitted under the
administrative search doctrine.202

198

This rule would support the

United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973).

See supra Part II.B.iii.
199

Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1272.

200

Ries, supra note 173.

201

Id.
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United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 180 (3rd Cir. 2006).

56

use of backscatter x-rays as secondary screening tools, and
conceivably prevent their use for primary screening.

The ACLU,

one of the most vocal opponents of the use of backscatter x-ray
for primary screening, supports its use as an alternative to
body cavity searches which have been legally triggered by other
primary screening means.203
The possibility that backscatter x-rays be used for primary
passenger screening in the future should be resisted.

As many

voices as possible should rally to defend the right to privacy
and declare that this type of search is and will remain
unreasonable to Americans, despite increasing terror fears.

V. Proposal
In today’s climate of terror and ever-evolving types of
threats, it is probably not possible to draw a distinct line
between what is a reasonable or unreasonable airline passenger
search under the Fourth Amendment.

The most important principle

to cling to is to require that searches invade on passengers’
privacy as minimally as possible.

203

“The level of intrusion – the

“[S]uch technology may be used in place of an intrusive

search, such as a body cavity search, when there is probable
cause sufficient to support such a search. Am. Civil Liberties
Union, supra note 194.
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degree to which a proposed measure invades privacy – should
reflect the level of risk, and, if both are effective, the least
intrusive physical screening technology or technique should
always trump the more invasive technology.”204

The

administrative search exception to the Fourth Amendment requires
this.205

This is similar to the analysis of whether a law

infringes on a fundamental right involves determining whether
the law survives strict scrutiny.

The government must show a

compelling actual purpose for the law, the means must be
narrowly tailored to the objective, and there can be no less
restrictive ways to achieve the objective.

Strict scrutiny

should be applied to the utilization of emerging airport
technologies that have the possibility of infringing on the
right to privacy.

Using the least personally invasive means of

screening airline passengers is how to be certain that there is
no method less restrictive to the right of privacy.
One method of making backscatter x-ray searches less
intrusive on privacy206 is to have an agent off-site view the
images in real time.

The embarrassment factor would be greatly

204

Sparapani, supra note 165.

205

See supra Part III.B.ii.

206

In addition to the cloaking technology, discussed supra in

Part II.D.
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reduced if passengers knew that the person viewing the detailed
images of their bodies were in a remote location.

Only if the

backscatter revealed a potentially prohibited item would an onsite agent be notified.

By separating the image from the actual

person, the general public would be relieved from some of the
humiliation and indignity that backscatter x-rays could cause.
Of course, knowing that the person looking at an image of
their virtually naked body is somewhere else may be of little
consolation to many passengers.

And people may feel violated

simply because they feel they have done nothing to deserve this
level of scrutiny.

Even this possible method of lessening the

impact of the privacy invasion by the backscatter x-ray leaves
the technology with too much power at the initial stage of
passenger screening.

Backscatter x-rays should be deemed

unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment if used for
primary screening.

Only when utilized as a substitute for other

methods currently used in secondary screening, such as pat-downs
and cavity searches, should the backscatter x-ray be adjudged
reasonable.

VI. Conclusion
Even in this post-September 11 era of heightened security
needs, we must be cautious to not let fear and desire for
protection override our privacy concerns and warp the definition
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of “reasonable.”
eroded.

There is no going back once rights have been

Society will become accustomed to the gradual

deterioration of rights and one day wake to find that privacy
rights have disappeared completely, and that was formerly
considered unreasonable is now reasonable.

There is no doubt we

face sometimes unimaginable threats, and we should be vigilant
in trying to guard against them.

However, some emerging

passenger screening technologies, such as backscatter x-rays,
have the ability to intrude too far and should be considered
unreasonable searches if used as a primary screening tool.
must never lose sight of the Fourth Amendment privacy rights
Americans hold dear.
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We

